Azerbaijan Permits Transit of Commercial Goods to Armenia

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue: 150
By: Onnik James Krikorian

https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijan-permits-transit-of-commercial-goods-to-armenia/

• Azerbaijan’s decision to allow commercial goods intended for Armenia to transit through its territory has been welcomed as the first major outcome following the August 8 meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders at the White House.
• The agreement on transit could not only reduce Armenia’s dependence on staples such as Russian wheat but also mark a first step in unblocking regional connectivity, a long-desired outcome of the negotiations between Yerevan and Baku since 2020. 
• Simultaneously, new possibilities for Track II diplomacy between the sides have emerged, including several visits by Azerbaijani researchers and analysts to meet with their Armenian counterparts in Yerevan.

Momentum continues to build toward a potential peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan following the August 8 declaration signed by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, witnessed by U.S. President Donald Trump (see EDM, August 12). Measures on trade and transit were at the center of the agreements reached at the summit. In a surprise announcement on October 21, Aliyev stated that Baku will now allow the shipment of wheat and other goods destined for Armenia to transit through its territory (Azatutyun, October 21). Land borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia have mostly been closed since the war in the early 1990s. The Armenian government announced that the first consignment to arrive in Armenia under this deal would be Kazakh wheat, transported via Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia’s rail network. Aliyev’s announcement was made during a visit to Astana, at a joint press conference held with Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. 

The last time a similar incident occurred was four years ago, when Azerbaijan agreed to the transit of Russian gas to Armenia through Georgia while the North Caucasus-Transcaucasia pipeline was under maintenance (Trend, March 18, 2021). That was only a temporary measure, however, while the recent Azerbaijani declaration implied that this would be normal practice for any goods in the future.  

Pashinyan thanked Aliyev for this latest decision. The Azerbaijani leader declared that “peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia is no longer just on paper, but also in practice” (Astana Times; ArmenPress, October 22). No date has been given for the arrival of wheat. When the first consignment of wheat arrived in Armenia, however, it was not from Kazakhstan as expected but from Russia. Pashinyan seemed genuinely surprised by the unexpected development (Azatutyun, November 6). He also warned that further delays could occur as businesses eager to import and export goods to and from Russia via rail clamoured to do so, apparently creating logistical problems for the Kazakh wheat (News.am, November 6). Nonetheless, the arrival of 1,000 tons of wheat by rail rather than road was welcomed in Yerevan (Azatutyun, November 6). The previous Soviet-era rail connection between Russia and Georgia’s separatist region of Abkhazia, which also passes through Armenia, has remained closed since the early 1990s. Passage by road through Georgia remains problematic in the winter months (Jam-News, May 19). Despite the surprise development with the Kazakh wheat, it is still expected to arrive in Armenia. According to officials, Russia has also announced, however, that it will deliver significantly more wheat to Armenia by the end of January next year (Trend, November 6). 

Following the 44-day war in 2020 and the return of Azerbaijani territory that Yerevan had previously controlled, Armenia’s wheat supply dropped (News.am, February 15, 2022). According to the government, Armenia is unable to grow its own wheat to compensate for the loss and meet its domestic demand in a way that proves economically viable. Armenia could have made subsidies available to farmers to increase production, but it decided to seek new supplies instead to offset its reliance on Moscow (Business Media, November 5, 2024). 

As Yerevan seeks to diversify its dependencies away from Moscow, food security remains one of several areas that need to be addressed. Last year, Armenia imported 316,000 tons of wheat, almost all of it from Russia (ArmInfo, August 12). Concerns persist that Russia’s war against Ukraine could continue to affect supply (Caucasus Watch, December 30, 2024). When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Yerevan experienced shortages in supermarkets due to panic buying (Azatutyun, March 11, 2022). When Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan participated in a video conference last year to address food security in Ukraine, Spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, made what was considered a veiled threat, saying that he would be better concerned with the situation in his own country. In response, Grigoryan quipped that Armenia might import rice from abroad to lessen dependency on Russian wheat (Azatutyun, October 14, 2024). 

Following the announcement of the delivery of Kazakh wheat, Pashinyan stated that he was also ready to allow Turkish trucks to transit through Armenian territory to Azerbaijan (Armenia Public TV, October 27). Baku, however, does not deem this route to meet its requirements, and the modalities of an agreed-upon route from Azerbaijan through Armenia—now named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)—to its exclave of Nakhchivan are still under discussion (see EDM, October 15). Many Azerbaijani political analysts agree and note that Azerbaijan and Türkiye are already connected through Georgia by road and rail connections (Modern, October 27). 

Baku’s main focus is on connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan, while Yerevan continues to pin its hopes on Türkiye opening its border with Armenia before, rather than after, a peace agreement is signed (see EDM, September 22). Pashinyan’s proposed route through Sisian and Goris, unlike the TRIPP on the Iranian border, often experiences difficult weather in the winter months (RACHR, February 1, 2021). 

Recent developments on trade and transit offer a glimmer of hope for the future. This was further highlighted by other developments involving civil society. In September, Murad Muradov, co-founder and deputy director of the Baku-based Topchubashov Center, visited Yerevan to participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly Rose Roth Seminar (Azernews, September 22). Two more Azerbaijani analysts arrived in Yerevan in early November to speak on panels organised by the Armenian government’s Orbeli Center (ReOpen, November 4). Despite such visits having not been uncommon in the past, they have become less regular since the war in 2020. 

Since negotiations over a potential rapprochement began, there have been attempts to resume such connections. Officials from both sides have also traveled to each other’s capitals for international events, primarily in the spheres of security, politics, and sports (ArmenPress, February 21, 2022; ArmenPress, March 2023; Armenia Public Radio, September 19). Muradov, however, is the first to do so from what can be considered civil society. 

Last month, an Azerbaijani Airlines flight also touched down in Yerevan, marking one of the first direct flights in many years (AnewZ, November 2). Additional Azerbaijani civil society representatives were on board, traveling to meet with their Armenian counterparts to discuss the normalization process (Orda, October 23). This trip was bilaterally organized without the involvement of third-party mediators or facilitators. Before the 2020 war, most visits were undertaken under the auspices of international bodies. 

This format involved both civil society and the two governments directly in what is more commonly referred to as Track 1.5 diplomacy (USIP, July 31, 2019). Grigoryan joined the meeting and took questions (ArmenPress, October 22). Muradov traveled to Armenia the previous month via Istanbul (Global Art, October 16). Although Armenian and Azerbaijani airspace is open to each other, there are no regularly scheduled flights between Yerevan and Baku (Eurasianet, October 6, 2021). At the end of October, Armenian National Assembly Speaker Alen Simonyan signaled that there should be more mutual visits by official delegations (Azatutyun, October 31).

Azerbaijan’s decision to allow the transit of goods destined for Armenia through its territory marks a gradual improvement in relations between the two sides. Both countries increasingly refer to the situation as a de facto peace, although it is still not yet a de jure one. The recent arrival of Azerbaijani researchers and other civil society members in Yerevan for talks also signals an evolution away from isolation toward more pragmatic and positive forms of cooperation. 

Eurasia Daily Monitor